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Many studies have examined how children categorize various objects but few
studies have looked at how children categorize race. Research shows that adults tend
to essentialize race; that is, they treat race as a natural kind (Madole, Keleman,
Glerum & Webb, 1999). Do children treat race in the same manner? This study
examines how preschool children, second grade children, and fourth grade children
treat race. Children were presented with stories and pictures describing a
transformation to a person's racial characteristics (that is, a change in external
appearance from white to black or black to white features) and asked to what category
the person belonged after the changes. To examine whether children treat race more
like a biological change or an artifact change, similar stories described changes to
animals and to artifacts. It was hypothesized that the development of essentialization
is related to an acquired knowledge of inheritance. Results showed that
essentialization of racial categories follows a developmental progression in which
preschool children do not essentialize race, some second grade students have started
to essentialize race, and a greater number of fourth graders essentialize race. The
introduction of inheritance did not significantly affect children's essentialization of
race. Overall, some hypotheses were confirmed, others were disconfirmed, and some
unexpected results were found.

vi

I. Introduction
The ability to categorize is a fundamental process of human cognition, and is
therefore one of the foremost areas of research for psychologists. Without the ability
to categorize, the world would be overwhelmingly complex. Imagine the need to
respond differently to every object encountered instead of being able to recognize
exemplars of categories that encompass a wide range of known and novel objects. If
every person, every object, every event, and every experience needed to be identified
and dealt with as individual instances instead of representations of categories, the
world would be incomprehensible. Categorization allows us to order and simplify
our world by reducing the complexity to a manageable and efficient system of
categories and sub-categories and by allowing us to make inductive inferences about
objects that we encounter (Gelman, 1988). For example, there are many chairs in our
world, but we do not treat each kind of chair as a new object. Instead, when people
encounter a chair in their environment it is usually quickly recognized and mentally
pigeonholed into the "chair" category. Adults seem to recognize certain features
shared by exemplars of the chair category and are able to induce the object's category
membership.
Nominal Kinds, Natural Kinds, and Artifacts
Objects in our world can be broken into three distinct conceptual representations,
or kinds of categories: nominal kinds, artifacts, and natural kinds. Schwartz (1979)
defines a nominal kind as ". . . any term which gathers its extension not by an
underlying trait but by a list of semantically associated descriptive properties (p.
310)." Schwartz proposes that nominal kinds are defined by a list of necessary and
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sufficient characteristics. For an example, an uncle may have many features (a beard,
a jovial disposition, a habit of giving terrible gifts), but these features are only
characteristic of some uncles, none of these is necessary for a person to fit the
definition of an uncle, nor are they sufficient to define the concept of uncle. The
necessary characteristics are that (a) the person is male, and (b) that he is the sibling
of a child's parent; without these two characteristics, the person is not an "uncle."
These two characteristics combined are also sufficient; that is, only these two facts
need to be present for a person to be an uncle.
In this paper, I am primarily concerned with the next two kinds of categories:
artifacts and natural kinds. Artifacts are created objects that depend upon function for
their identity (Keil, 1989); that is, artifacts are defined by how they are used, their
characteristic actions, or the intended purpose of the creator (Madole, 1993; Nelson,
1979; Richards, Goldfarb, Richards, & Hassen, 1989). When the function of an
artifact changes, adults will treat the artifact as a member of a different category. An
example of an artifact is a coffeepot. As long as it is used to make or hold coffee, we
believe that it is, in fact, a coffeepot. However, if we make some simple changes to
the object (e.g., fill it with birdseed and hang it somewhere accessible to birds), it can
become a birdfeeder. When changes are made to the function of an artifact the
artifact may change categories.
Schwartz (1979) defines "natural kind" more precisely as any term that derives its
meaning only from an underlying trait (that is, its "essence"). Examples of natural
kinds are those things that occur naturally in the world around us (ergo, "natural"
kinds), such as animals and plants. We may not know for sure what makes a cat a
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cat, but there is an underlying property or trait that gives the cat its "catness."
Essentialist Thinking About Natural Kinds
Philosophers tend to debate the existence of essences. For psychologists,
however, (e.g., Medin and Ortony) the actual existence of essences is less important
than people's beliefs in the existence of essences. Psychological essentialism refers to
the idea that people form representations of objects that include the belief (correct or
incorrect) that some objects (i.e., natural kinds) have internal, perhaps unknown,
essences that make the objects what they are. These essences may or may not
actually exist, but the belief that they exist is important in forming representations of
objects (Medin & Ortony, 1989). In other words, people treat natural kinds as if they
believe that these kinds of objects have "essences" that are not always immediately
discernable, something that goes beyond what is superficially apparent (Keil, 1989).
We define the instance of a natural kind according to this presumed essence. Keil
(1989) adds that people tend to treat natural kinds in ways that preserve their kind
across superficial transformations; that is, people believe natural kinds resist changes
in category membership, even if the entity's appearance changes dramatically.
Psychological essentialism is an important concept in understanding category
formation. A commonly used paradigm for studying essentialist thinking is to present
participants with brief stories that describe a change in the appearance of an object so
that it has all of the superficial characteristics of another object (e.g., a raccoon
changed in appearance to resemble a skunk). Stories are accompanied by "before"
and "after" pictures. Participants are then asked whether the object is still an instance
of the original category, or now an instance of the "new" category (e.g., "Is this
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animal now a skunk or is it still a raccoon?"). Essentialist thinking is reflected in a
tendency to deny that the object has changed its category membership. Results of
studies using this method (e.g., Keil, 1989) have shown that people tend to
essentialize natural categories (e.g., humans and birds), but not artifact categories
(e.g., coffeepots and bird feeders).
Adults tend to categorize natural kinds based upon presumed essences; do children
as well? The answer to that question is embedded within the larger question of how
children develop categories. One current, major debate in the area of category
development concerns the roles of perceptual and conceptual features. Perceptual
features are those things that we derive from sensory experiences, for example, seeing
that a bird has a beak, hearing that a bird sings, or feeling that a bird has soft feathers.
Conceptual features, on the other hand, refer to the representations that we form of
our environment — that is, to more abstract relationships and non-visible features.
For example, a toy poodle and a bullmastiff are both dogs despite glaring perceptual
differences. Two basic differing opinions exist in the current literature. One position
maintains that humans have the ability to form conceptual categories from infancy,
and that categorization occurs at a conceptual level from early in life (Hirschfeld,
1994, 1995; Mandler, 1993). The other view maintains that the formation of
categories is a process of gathering perceptual information that evolves into concepts
as more and more information becomes available (Madole & Oakes, 1999).
Some psychologists postulate that the developmental changes from perceptuallybased representations to conceptually-based representations are more a qualitative
shift than a quantitative shift (Hirschfeld, 1994; Keil, 1989; Mandler, 1993). This
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position divides conceptualization and perception into dichotomous processes, which
either do not overlap (Keil, 1991) or that are mediated by a complex process of
redescription that Mandler (1993) calls "perceptual analysis." According to Mandler,
"perceptual analysis" is a process that transforms the rudimentary perceptual patterns
that stem from the sensory information available to infants and children into a more
sophisticated conceptual format. Mandler claims that concepts have " . . . a nonperceptual core. . . (p. 142)", which leads to the bemusing conclusion that concepts
must then spring from other concepts. This perspective de-emphasizes the role of
perception in conceptual category formation, holding that infants have an a priori
ability to form concepts without relying solely upon perceptual — a classic case of
which comes first, the chicken, or the egg.
Other psychologists argue that the shift from perceptual discrimination to
conceptual theorization is based upon the increasing quantity of knowledge available
to the developing child, rather than a qualitative structural shift (Jones & Smith, 1993;
Madole & Oakes, 1999; Springer, 1996). The developing child, according to this
viewpoint, is expert at the induction of correlations based upon available and repeated
perceptual cues. The child develops conceptual theories through observations of
increasingly complex correlations. Madole and Oakes (1999) argue that ". . . one of
the most critical aspects of developmental change in infants' categorization is their
increasing attention to abstract features of objects and their recognition of the
relationship between abstract features and perceptual features (p. 272)." To illustrate,
imagine a child who notices that an object called "bird" has a beak, has feathers, and
can fly. Every time something that is called "bird" appears, the child takes note that
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it, too, has a beak, has feathers and can fly. Soon the child begins to form a concept
of "bird - an object that has a beak, has feathers, and can fly." As this child develops,
she attends not only to perceptual features of the category "bird"(e.g., can fly, has a
beak, has feathers, etc.) but also to abstract features (e.g., has common organs,
migrates, has bird genetics, etc.). Over time, the child perceives more details
regarding this concept of "bird," the amount of knowledge available to the child
grows, and the concept of bird becomes more complex and theory-like. The child
formulates a concept of bird "essence", which includes some internal criterion of
"birdness" that allows a robin, a parrot, an ostrich, and a penguin to each fall into that
category despite perceptual differences. This process involves a shift from
perceptually based inference to conceptually based inference - as more information
becomes available to the child.
Children and Essentialist Beliefs
Children seem to show some belief in the existence of essential properties. A study
by Gelman and Markman (1987) suggests that even 3 year-old children have
knowledge that natural kind category membership includes more than superficial
features, and that category membership is more relevant to children's inferences than
are perceptual features. In other words, even children as young as 3 years old
essentialize natural kind categories to an extent. Similarly, Keil (1989) conducted a
study in which a transformation to an artifact or a natural object was described. For
example, doctors change various aspects of a raccoon (e.g., paint a stripe on it, add an
odor gland) and show before and after pictures (raccoon and skunk). Children were
then questioned as to which category they believed the animal belongs. Artifact
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examples were presented in the same manner. Keil found that, when presented with
stories in which a raccoon is surgically transformed so that it has the appearance of a
skunk, children as young as 7 years of age will deny that the animal is now a skunk
(Keil, 1989).
The fact that children essentialize many natural kind categories does not
automatically indicate that even young children are using only conceptual thinking.
Treating perception and conception as inextricably locked in a reciprocal relationship
is logically more palatable than treating them as separate entities. Even adults make
mistakes that indicate the interactive nature of conception and perception. For
example, adults make conceptual mistakes based upon perceptual information (e.g., a
dolphin as a fish rather than a mammal, a tomato as a vegetable rather than a fruit,
etc.) but will modify their conceptualizations based upon discovered information.
This new information, in turn, will modify perceptions (e.g., we now inescapably see
that, indeed, the dolphin has a blowhole for breathing air like a mammal rather than
gills to breathe as a fish). This type of "initial mistake + new information =
modification" relationship strongly suggests an interaction between perceptual and
conceptual processing that is mediated by the available quantity or quality of
information.
Children, Race, and Essentialism
While a large literature exists on the development of object categorization
(Mandler, 1993; Younger, 1993; also see Keil, 1989 and Madole & Oakes, 1999 for
reviews), there has been little research examining children's development of racial
categorization (Madole & Oakes, 1999). Racial categories are familiar to all of us,
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yet the manner in which those categories are formed is relatively unknown (Madole et
al., 1999). Do children go through developmental stages in their formation of racial
categories? Of the studies that have examined this question, few give concrete
information about the process of children's acquisition of adult-like racial
categorization.
How do children categorize race? The answer to that question varies according to
different research. In a series of studies, Hirschfeld (1995) finds support for his belief
that children have an adult-like theory of race from a very young age — that is, that
even very young children essentialize race. His work seems to support the claim that
children as young as three years of age believe that a person's race is unalterable but,
interestingly, that their bodies are not. He reports that "By 4 years of age children
believe that race is fixed by birth, expecting the inheritance of racial features to be
mediated by biological reproduction. In short, preschoolers demonstrate a
biologically grounded understanding of race (p. 240)."
Hirschfeld's work consistently finds evidence for a precocious understanding of
race and biology. His methodology, however, leads to questions as to what the
findings truly indicate regarding race and biology. For example, in a series of studies
exploring the development of racial conceptualization, Hirschfeld (1995) uses
drawings of figures as stimuli to depict several changes in a person's appearance.
Examining previous research, Hirschfeld discusses that a drawback in previous
studies was that the kinds of properties that were being manipulated, skin color for
example, were familiar to children, but the actual transformations presented were
outside children's realm of experience; that is, children never see a person of
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Caucasian appearance change into a person of African-American appearance. Says
Hirschfeld: "Previous work may thus underestimate young children's knowledge of
identity constancy because subjects have been asked to reason about personal identity
in the face of unfamiliar changes in a person's appearance" (pp. 218-219). Yet,
saying that, he then immediately describes a study of his own in which the stimuli
used lack realism. The kind of human transformations presented are within children's
experience, but other transformations that he used are not; a normal car transformed
into a "fat" car is not something with which children are familiar. Madole and Oakes
(1999) present a summary of literature demonstrating that the realism of a given
stimulus directly affects the responses given by children. It is questionable whether
Hirschfeld's stimuli are realistic enough to elicit responses representative of
children's understanding and actual knowledge applied to people and objects in their
environment.
In contrast to Hirschfeld, others researchers cite evidence in support of a gradual
development of racial categories and believe that young children respond purely to
perceptual cues of race rather than an underlying knowledge of genetics and an adultlike essentialization (Aboud, 1988; Semaj, 1980). Semaj (1980) reports results from
a study that probed race constancy in African-American children. The findings
suggest that mastery of racial constancy does not occur until sometime after age 11
(the oldest sample in the study). Semaj reports that only 40% of the 10-11 year-old
children in the study maintained racial constancy when the stimulus' skin and hair
color were altered. In other words, children as old as 11 did not essentialize race
reliably. However, Madole et al. (1999) report that nearly all adults believed that,
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despite changes in appearance, the stimulus person's race had not changed.
In the Madole et al. 1999 study, adults were presented with a packet containing
various stories that described permanent changes to a person's gender, a person's
race, a person's hair length, an animal's species, or an object's appearance and
function. The stories were accompanied by pictures to illustrate the changes
described. The results obtained by this study indicate that adults tend to think of race
as a natural kind, that is, immutable and essential to identity (Madole et al., 1999). In
fact, adults were more likely to indicate that a person could change their gender than
change racial categories!
Do children tend to view race as belonging to a category other than natural kinds?
That is, are they willing to say that an individual can change race by changing
appearance? Somewhere along the way, children learn that race is more than the
perception of skin color and begin to form a theory; they begin to conceptualize race.
At what point, however, do they begin to make that transition? I think that it has to
do, at least in part, with a child's developing understanding that race is genetically
based. Clark, Hocevar, and Dembo (1980) found support for the hypothesis that
children's explanations of skin color go through a predictable developmental
sequence, ranging from supernaturalism (God made them that way) to physicalism
(genetic causes). They also found support for the hypothesis that developmental
prerequisites for an adult theory-like understanding of the origins of skin color
include understanding physical conservation, understanding that phenomena have
physical causes, and understanding that one's identity does not change with age.
These comprehension levels match with a developing understanding of inheritance.
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Many researchers have demonstrated that race constancy develops somewhat later
than gender constancy, but tends to correlate with the same Piagetian stages gender
constancy does (Aboud, 1983; Bern, 1989; Clark et al., 1980; Semaj, 1980). In a
study examining children's perceptions of ethnic constancy, Aboud (1983) found
evidence that suggests that children do not acquire a consistent or confident
knowledge of ethnic constancy before age 8. She also found two other cognitive
abilities that correlated with the development of ethnic constancy: ethnic permanence
(knowledge of the unchangeable nature of ethnicity), and conservation.
Alejandro-Wright (1985) points out that many researchers define a child's ability
to apply racial terms as an ability to classify racially. However, she makes the case
that the ability to apply racial terms falls short of true racial classification in that this
task only requires identification ("give me the white/black/etc. dolly) not actual
classification (grouping similar things). She used a series of interviews in which
children were given a spontaneous classification task, a structured classification task,
and a probing task. She demonstrated that younger children (two groups in her study:
3-4 year olds and 5-6 year olds) show a tendency to spontaneously group people
using criteria other than race or skin color. Even when older children (8-10 years of
age) begin to spontaneously categorize by racial category, they show a tendency to
use labels other than the socialized adult labels.
So, what exactly is it that triggers a developmental understanding of race? In light
of the studies suggesting that race constancy and gender constancy are
developmentally correlated (Aboud, 1983; Bern, 1989; Clark et al., 1990; Semaj,
1980), it makes sense to take a brief look at gender constancy for clues as to what
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type of information may contribute to race constancy.

Bern (1989) discusses

previous measures of gender constancy and demonstrates that the traditional methods
are subject to misinterpretation; they fail to truly test gender conservation across
perceptual transformation, or are artificial. The previous studies do not address any
underlying biological knowledge that children may have regarding what makes
someone in "essence" a boy or a girl. She developed a new measure for gender
constancy in a study that involved children's knowledge of genitalia as a measure for
gender constancy. Her results indicate that gender constancy is not so much purely a
developmental stage (as previous researchers believed) as it is a simple matter of (a) a
knowledge of genital differences in boys and girls and (b) the knowledge that genital
cues are more important than social cues for gender identity. This combination of
knowledge, specific to the domain of sexual identity, is the crucial piece for
development of gender constancy.
What, then, is the domain-specific piece of knowledge that leads to the
development of race constancy? I hypothesize that children's knowledge of
inheritance will play an important role. Studies indicate that even preschool aged
children have biological knowledge of inheritance (Springer & Keil, 1989) and
distinguish between biological and social domains (Springer, 1992). The second
point is consistent with Bern's (1989) findings that children need not only to be aware
of biological genital differences but, importantly, must also understand that biological
domains take precedence over social domains. Springer (1992) also reports that
children will base their inductions upon physical similarity when no information
regarding kinship is given. When kinship is introduced, they judge it as more
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relevant than physical similarity, and will preferentially base their inductions upon
kinship. In addition, he indicates that social relationship is not considered as salient
for children as is kinship.
Do young children automatically view race as an immutable, essential component
of identity, or do they gradually develop a preference for essentializing race? More
specifically, do children have an innate tendency to essentialize race or is it
something that is developed as they gain experience and knowledge of the world?
Based upon the research by Bern (1989), Spring (1992), and Springer and Keil
(1989), I hypothesize several possible findings: first, if children view race as a
biological concept (a natural kind), and they also understand the concept of
inheritance, they will be more likely to essentialize it when presented with inheritance
information. If children view race as only a social concept, they will less likely
believe it is inheritable, and by extension, less likely to essentialize it. Second, if
children understand inheritance, then the physical similarities or differences of
socially related individuals will have less impact than the physical similarities or
differences of biologically related individuals. Thus if children are presented with a
change in racial appearance and in addition are presented with information relating to
inheritance (e.g., pictures of parents) they will be more likely to hold views of race
constancy. Third, as children age, they will increasingly view race as a biological
concept and begin to comprehend inheritance and its impact on natural kind
transformations. These increasing awarenesses will impact their theories of racial
categorization, which will look more and more adult-like with increasing age.
The study proposed here is an extension of one designed and implemented by
Madole et al. (1999), which explored the conditions under which adults essentialize
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the social categories of race and sex. Madole points out that little attention has been
devoted to examining adult essentialist beliefs regarding social categories. This study
will examine the conditions under which children essentialize the social category of
race, essentially replicating the Madole et al., (1999) study with children. Children
were presented with modifications of stories used by Madole, excluding those
describing sex transformations. The criterion stories and pictures described a racial
appearance change (black to white or white to black), and children were asked to
identify the person's post-change category membership.

II. Method
Participants
Students from preschools and elementary schools in the Bowling Green, Kentucky
vicinity participated in the study. The first age group, twenty three- and four-yearolds, were recruited from a Montessori preschool. The second age group, eighteen
seven- and eight-year-olds (roughly second grade, some from the first grade), and the
third age group, eighteen nine- and ten-year-olds (roughly fourth grade, some from
the third grade) were recruited from a public elementary school. We contacted the
local school board for permission to conduct the study within the school system. One
elementary school principal volunteered to allow the research to be conducted in her
school. Teachers were contacted for permission to conduct the study within specific
classrooms. Permission to conduct research at the preschool was obtained from the
director. Parents of the students were contacted through a letter sent home with the
children (see Appendix B). The letter emphasized that participation was voluntary
and that children would receive a small token (a Western Kentucky University pencil)
for returning the consent forms. The token was presented for the return of the form
and was not contingent upon willingness to participate. Students at each age level,
with parental consent to participate, were randomly selected and assigned to one of
the two conditions, counterbalanced for gender. All procedures were approved by the
Human Subjects Review Board of Western Kentucky University.
Stimuli
The interviewer presented stories adapted from Madole et al. (1999) to
communicate various changes to an object, animal, or person at a level accessible to
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children. Race change stories presented a scenario that introduced a person of either
white or black appearance. The person was described as looking and acting like
"most black/white boys/girls" while growing up, after which a picture of the person
was presented. Another picture, supposedly of the person's natural parents or
neighbors (depending on condition) was also presented. Next, a visit to the doctor
was described, during which the doctor changed the appearance of the person to
resemble the picture of the other ethnicity (black/white). A new picture, presumably
of the same person after the doctor's visit, was presented for the child. The child was
then asked what he/she thought the person now was, "still a black/white person, or are
they now a white/black person"? The response was recorded and follow up questions
were asked regarding the race of this person's potential offspring. A similar pattern
was followed for the artifact changes and for the hair length changes, with minor
changes to accommodate the differences in storyline. Examples of the stories and
accompanying pictures can be seen in Appendix A.
Stories were accompanied by "before" and "after" photographs, as well as pairs of
"parent" or "neighbor" photographs (depending on condition) that reflected the pretransformation race, species, or artifact stimuli. Picture stimuli were obtained from
several current on-line fashion magazines, animal-oriented websites, and from
commercially available morphing software (e.g., Kai's Super Goo). The photographs
were manipulated using Adobe Photoshop 5.0. The pictures were then printed in
black and white on glossy photo-quality paper with an ink-jet printer. The pictures
were cut into 4 by 5 cards and laminated for durability. Examples of the stimuli can
be seen in Appendix A.
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Design and Procedure
Children were interviewed at their respective schools. Data was collected from
each child in a single, 10-15 minute individual interview. Interviews were scheduled
at the discretion of the children's classroom teachers. Each child was told that his or
her parents had given permission for the child to participate in what we were doing.
They were told, in age-appropriate language, that they did not have to participate if
they did not want to, and could quit at anytime without penalty. After the child
indicated assent (orally for the youngest children, via signature for older children) the
experimenter read a brief set of instructions telling the child that some of the
questions "will seem unusual, but that [you] should answer as best that [you] can and
that there is no right' answer."
Sessions were conducted in vacant classrooms or other available places within the
schools, depending upon changing availability. Children were seated across a desk or
table from the examiner. Each session was tape-recorded for later transcription.
The examiner read seven short stories involving a change in appearance of an animal,
an object, or a person. Four of the stories read to the children involved a change in
the physical characteristics that specify an individual's race, and three were control
stories. The gender of the Stimulus person (Stimulus Gender) and direction of race
change (Direction of change) were within subjects variables: each child received one
set of stories and pictures demonstrating a black male changing in appearance to a
white male, a white male changing in appearance to a black male, a black female
changing in appearance to a white female and a white female changing in appearance
to a black female.
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One-half of the participants were randomly assigned to the Inheritance condition
and the remaining half were assigned to the Non-inheritance condition. In the
Inheritance condition, the participants received race change stories that indicated
inheritance by displaying a male and female pair of the same initial racial appearance
as the Stimulus person. This pair was described as parents of the Stimulus person
(Stimulus Parents). In the Non-inheritance condition, participants received stories
that displayed a male and female pair of the same initial racial appearance who were
described as neighbors of the stimulus person (Stimulus Neighbors).
All participants received the same three control stories. One story described
artifact changes (coffeepot to bird feeder) with the manipulation of
"Inheritance"(made in same factory) for one half of the participants, and "Noninheritance" (made in different factories) for the other half. One story described
animal changes (squirrel to rabbit), with inheritance split between the two conditions,
and one described hairstyle changes (long hair to short hair), again with an
inheritance split between conditions. Each story was accompanied by a "before"
transformation and an "after" transformation picture as well as pictures of "parents"
and "neighbors."
The stories were presented in two different, semi-random orders. The order was
arranged so that no more than two race change stories were presented in sequence; the
artifact, animal, and hair change stories were used to divide up the race change
stories. The order was counterbalanced within age and child's gender.
Following each story, participants were asked to verbally indicate the stimulus'
category membership (for example, is this person still a black person, or is he now a
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white person?). Participants' responses were marked on an answer sheet and were
also recorded with an audio tape recorder. To further probe the inheritance aspect,
follow-up questions were asked regarding the category membership of the stimulus'
offspring (e.g., "If 'Sally' had babies, what would her babies be? Would they be
white babies or would they be black babies?"). The independent variable of the two
different questions asked, whether the target stimulus changed, and whether the
offspring have changed, will be henceforth referred to as Question. After all stories
were read, children were probed for more information about what they believe makes
someone the race that they are, why they can or cannot change, and why their
children do or do not change.
Participants were debriefed at an age-appropriate level and any questions that they
had were answered. As a precaution, children were assured in debriefing that this
kind of change does not actually happen, even by mistake, and that the questions we
asked were just to discover what children would think if it could have happened.

III. Results
The presentation of each story was followed by a question for which one of two
answers was possible: change of category membership or no change of category
membership. Each child was given a score of 1 for each response that indicated a
change in category membership, and assigned a score of 0 for each response that
indicated retention of category membership. Lower scores would indicate greater
essentializing of the category.
The first analysis examined children's responses to the race change questions. I
did not believe that Stimulus Gender would have a significant effect on the answers
that the children gave. To assess whether Stimulus Gender had a significant impact
on the children's answers, scores were summed across direction of change resulting
in a score from 0 (no change) to 2 (both stimuli changed). I then used a two-tailed,
paired t-test to examine children's responses when the stimulus was a woman versus
when the stimulus was a man. Children showed no difference in responses to the
stimulus change questions when the stimuli were female (M = 1.57) than when the
stimuli were male (M = 1.60), r(59) = .63, p = .53. As well, there were no significant
differences in responses to the offspring question when the stimulus was female (M =
1.32) than when the stimulus was male (AT = 1.38), t{59) = 1.07, p = .29. Therefore, I
collapsed across Stimulus Gender: female black to white race change and male black
to white race change form a single response, and female white to black race change
and male white to black race change form the second response. Therefore, each
child's scores could range from 0 to 2 for changes to the stimulus person, and 0 to 2
for changes to the offspring.
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I also postulated that Order would not affect the answers that children gave. I used
a two-tailed t-test to examine the effects of Order. Order 1 scores were marginally
higher (M = 3.5) than Order 2 scores (AT = 2.79), t(59) = 1.88, p = .06. Therefore,
Order was included in the analyses.
A major hypothesis was a main effect of Age. I hypothesized that older children
would have lower scores than would younger children, indicating that older children
were less likely to accept a transformation than were younger children. A second
hypothesis was an Age x Inheritance Condition interaction; I believed that the
introduction of inheritance information would be more likely to lower older
children's scores than younger children's scores. Third, I predicted a main effect of
Direction of Change, with children being more likely to accept a race change in the
direction of the majority (that is, from black to white). Lastly, an Age x Question x
Inheritance interaction was hypothesized. I hypothesized that older children would be
more likely to treat the racial category of a stimulus' offspring as a natural kind when
inheritance was emphasized than would younger children or children for whom
inheritance was not emphasized. In order to evaluate these hypotheses, scores were
entered into a 3 (age group) x 2 (inheritance condition) x 2 (direction of change) x 2
(question) x 2 (order) repeated measures ANOVA. Age group, inheritance condition,
and order were between subject variables. Question and direction of change were
repeated measures.
This analysis resulted in a main effect of Age, F(2, 48) = 10.19, p < .01.
Preschool children (M = 1.67) were more likely to say that a stimulus changed racial
category than were 4lh grade children (M = 1.03), F(l, 48) = 17.13,p < .01. Likewise,
2nd grade children (M = 1.64) were more likely to say that a stimulus changed racial
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category than were 4lh graders, F(l, 48) = 13.93, p < .01. . Preschool children did not
differ significantly from 2nd grade children, F ( l , 48) = .023, p = .88.
This analysis also revealed a main effect of Question, F ( l , 48) = 6.57, p < .05.
Change scores were higher for the target stimuli (M = 1.58) than for the offspring of
the target stimuli (M = 1.35).
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Order, F ( l , 48) = 15.71, p < .01.
Children who received order 1 (M = 1.71) were more likely to report that a stimulus
changed racial categories than children who received order 2 (M = 1.19). An Age x
Order interaction was also found (table 1), F(2, 48) = 3.73, p < .05. Single degree of
Figure 1. Age x Order Interaction
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freedom contrasts revealed that preschoolers who received order 1 (A/ = 1.75) did not
differ in their scores than did preschoolers who received order 2 (M = 1.57), F ( l , 48)
= .008, p = .93. Second graders who received order 1 (A/ = 1.8) did not differ
significantly in their answers than did 2nd graders who received order 2 (M = 1.44),
F( 1, 48) = .48, p =.49. However, 4lh graders who received order 1 (M = 1.56)
obtained higher change scores than 4'h graders who received order 2 (M = .5), F(l, 48)
= 18.37,/? = .93.
The Condition x Order interaction was also significant, F(l, 48) = 6.75, p = .014.
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Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed that children in the inheritance condition,
order 1 (M = 1.94) had higher change scores than children in the inheritance
condition, order 2 (M - 1.1), F ( l , 48) = 21.45, p < .05. However, children in the
noninheritance condition, order 1 (M = 1.45) did not differ from the children in the
noninheritance condition, order 2 (M = 1.27), F(l, 48) = .936,p = .34.
Finally, there was a Question x Direction x Inheritance Condition interaction, F(l,
48) = 4.2, p < .05. To simplify this analysis I ran a separate analysis for each
Question type; one analysis for the target stimuli, and one analysis for the offspring of
the target stimuli. Analysis of the target stimuli scores did not reveal effects of
condition or direction, but did reveal a marginal Direction x Condition interaction,
F(l, 58) = 3.73, p = .06. Children's response scores for the target stimuli in the white
to black, inheritance condition (M = 1.67) were higher than for the black to white,
inheritance condition (M = 1.6). Children's response scores for the white to black,
noninheritance condition (M = 1.47) were lower than for the black to white,
noninheritance condition (M = 1.6), although none of these differences were
significant. For the offspring question, there was a trend toward a Condition effect,
F(l, 58) = 2.80, p < .10. Children in the inheritance condition (M = 1.52) had higher
scores than children in the noninheritance condition (M = 1.18). This trend was in the
opposite direction from what was expected. The analysis of the offspring question
also revealed an effect of direction of change, F(l, 58) = 4.49, p = .05. As
hypothesized, children had lower scores when the race change was from black to
white (M - 1.25) than when the race change was from white to black (M = 1.45).
There was not a Condition x Direction interaction for the offspring question.
I predicted an overall Direction main effect, hypothesizing that children would be
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more likely to accept a change in the direction of the majority (that is, black to white).
While there is not a significant main effect of the direction of change, there is a trend
in the direction expected, F( 1, 48) = 3.36, p = .07. Racial change from black to white
(M = 1.53) resulted in marginally higher change scores than from white to black (M =
1.41)
I predicted that there would be an Age x Inheritance Condition interaction but
analysis disconfirmed my hypothesis, F{ 1, 48) = .58, p = .56. As well, I predicted an
Age x Inheritance Condition x Question interaction that was also disconfirmed, F{2,
48) = .15, p = .86.
The goal of the next set of analyses was to determine whether, overall, children
viewed race more like a biological entity or like an artifact. To examine whether
children viewed race more like a biological entity or like an artifact required the
comparison of race stories with animal and artifact stories. I used chi square analyses
to examine these categorical responses. As predicted, there was an increasing
tendency to essentialize race as children's age increased. The initial analysis
examined children's responses to see if the children treated changes to animals
different than they treated changes to artifacts. Preschool students treated animals
and artifacts similarly ,2 (1) = .36, p = .55, Preschoolers, overwhelmingly responded
that both animals and artifacts can change category membership. In other words,
preschoolers failed to essentialize either category. Second grade students treated
animals and artifacts as marginally different, with responses that indicated resistance
to the idea that animals could change categories as easily as artifacts, *2( 1) = 3.27, p =
.07. Fourth graders treated animals as significantly different from artifacts, ,2 (1) =
5.81,p < .05. Fourth grade responses clearly indicate that they are beginning to
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essentialize animals as natural kinds, and therefore resist animal changes more than
changes to artifacts (see Table 2).
The second chi square analysis examined children's responses to see if they
treated changes to race different than how they treated changes to animals. Preschool
children, -2(1) = .03,p = .87, 2nd graders, *2(1) = .02,p = .89, and 4th graders, *2(1) =
.77, p = .38 all treated racial categories as similar to animal categories.
Lastly, a chi square analysis was used to examine how children treated race
compared to how children treated artifacts. Preschool children treated race in the
same way that they treated artifacts — that is, that both were equally likely to change,
•2(1) = .68, p = .41. Second grade children essentialize race more than they do
artifacts, *2(1) = 3.8, p = .05, as do 4th grade children, »2(1) = 10.16,/? < .01.
Table 2. Percentage of Children Essentializing (denying changes to category
membership)

Age

Artifacts

Animals

Race

Preschool

4.17%

8.33%

9.38%

2nd Grade

0.00%

16.67%

18.06%

4lh Grade

0.00%

27.78%

38.89%

IV. Discussion
The results of this study provide some evidence in support of my predictions, but
they also revealed some unanticipated effects. I hypothesized that there would be a
significant main effect of the age of the child. I expected that older children would
have lower change scores than would younger children. This hypothesis was
confirmed. Older children had significantly lower scores than did younger children,
indicating that older children were more resistant to the idea that a person could
change racial categories than were younger children. Fourth grade students were
significantly more likely to deny that a person could change racial categories due to
changes made by a doctor than were 2nd graders or preschool children. Preschool
children and 2nd grade students did not differ in their responses. There appears to be a
shift in thinking somewhere between 2nd grade and 4 th grade that changes how
children think about racial categorization with increasing essentializing of race. What
is it that changes?
I hypothesized that inheritance was the domain-specific piece of knowledge that
children needed to develop an adult-like theory of race — that is, to treat race as a
natural kind. I believed that if children received information describing race as a
social concept (that is, the noninheritance condition) that they would be less likely to
hold views of race constancy than would children who were presented with
inheritance information (the inheritance condition). This prediction would have been
confirmed by a significant main effect of inheritance condition. I also expected that
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older children's responses would be influenced more by inheritance information than
would younger children's scores; therefore, I also predicted an Age x Inheritance
Condition interaction. Finally, I thought it was possible that children may accept
transformations to the stimuli but deny transformations to the offspring of the stimuli.
The photographic evidence of race changes might have influenced a child's decision
about the stimulus person's racial change despite the child's knowledge of inheritance
— that is, children's knowledge of inheritance may have been overridden by the visual
evidence of the transformation to the stimulus person. However, the latent
knowledge of inheritance may have resurfaced when children were then asked about
the offspring of the stimulus person. The visual evidence of the transformation may
have trumped children's knowledge of inheritance for that specific stimulus person,
but without visual evidence of the offspring, the knowledge of inheritance could have
caused children to predict that the offspring would remain the pre-transformation
race. In other words, while the children may accept transformations to the stimulus
because of the visual evidence, they may still reject transformations to the stimulus'
children because of inheritance. Therefore, I predicted an Age x Inheritance
Condition x Question interaction. However, contrary to my predictions, the
introduction of inheritance did not have a significant impact on the responses that the
children gave overall, nor did the predicted interactions emerge. Older children
resisted changes to race more than did younger children, but inheritance did not
appear to have any effect on their responses.
There are several possibilities about why inheritance did not affect children's
answers in this study. The first is that the children did not understand inheritance as it
might affect changes to a person's race. A second possibility is that inheritance is not
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relevant to children's treatment of racial categories and that the hypotheses I made
were simply incorrect. Perhaps knowledge of inheritance is unimportant to children.
However, contrary to both of these possibilities is Springer's (Springer & Keil, 1989;
Springer, 1992) evidence that children do, in fact, have a knowledge of inheritance
and that children place a higher priority on biological kinship than social relationship
when that information is presented. This finding would suggest that children both
understand the basic concept of inheritance and are influenced by inheritance
information when it is presented. Springer's research was foundational to my
hypothesis that children would respond differently to race when it was a social
relationship than they would when it was a kinship, and that the understanding of
inheritance would be key for a child beginning to essentialize race. Thus, an alternate
explanation is that the operationalization of inheritance information in this study
simply did not trigger children's knowledge of inheritance. The explanations of the
"parent" pictures were brief, and merely describing the people in the picture as
"parents" may have been insufficient to trigger the concept of inheritance, or the
mention of kinship or social information was unnoticed by the child. Perhaps the
novelty of the storyline presented and the possibility of a person changing their skin
color may have been so fascinating to children that it occupied their full attention and
the subtlety of the inheritance information was lost. As well, unlike Springer (1992),
I did not present the same children with both conditions of social relationship and
conditions of kinship. The presentation of both types of relationships sets the two in
contrast to each other and may force the child to make a choice about which to
emphasize. In this study, however, children were presented with only one condition
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or the other and the forced prioritizing of the inheritance versus noninheritance
information did not take place. Follow up studies could look at inheritance condition
as a repeated measure rather than as a between subjects variable. Information could
then be obtained about how individual children treat race when it is presented as a
social concept versus when it is presented as a kinship concept. Perhaps when
children are presented with both scenarios it will cause them to think differently about
how the racial identities and the relationships of the parents or the neighbors may
affect the possibility of the stimulus changing. As mentioned previously, it could also
have been that visual evidence of the transformations overpowered children's
knowledge of inheritance, presenting a more compelling reason to accept
transformations. Future studies could examine the same issues without using pictures
as evidence to provide a more accurate measure of how the knowledge of inheritance
factors into children's decisions by removing evidence that could override their
knowledge and cause their responses to change. Another important consideration for
future research is the presence or absence of inheritance knowledge. In this study, I
did not actually examine each child's level of understanding for inheritance. Future
research could screen to check children's understanding or lack of understanding of
inheritance and compare children's responses directly to their level of inheritance
knowledge.
Order turned out to be a main effect that was not predicted. Similarly, Age x
Order and Inheritance Condition x Order interactions were not expected.
Examination of the orders that were used present few obvious clues as to why order
should matter (see Appendix C). One possibility is related to the fact that the animal
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change story was presented first in Order 1, but the artifact change story was
presented first in Order 2. For the 4th grade students, having the object stimuli first
(order 2) may have cued them about what kinds of answers were expected. They
knew that a coffeepot could easily become a birdfeeder, but were sophisticated
enough to realize that changes to people were not quite as simple as changes to
objects and put more thought into their answers. This cueing may help to explain the
Age x Order effects. The younger students were not yet sophisticated enough to
understand the object transformations as different than transformations to people, but
the older students did. The possibility of a cueing effect for older children could be
explored more fully by specifically manipulating where object transformations are
placed in the order of stimuli to see if the object transformations affected responses
after their introduction. In this study, object transformations were either at the very
beginning or at the very end of the orders, so no further exploration of this possibility
is available. In my opinion it is more likely that, because of the small sample size (9
for each order in each age group), the 4th grade, order 2 group randomly happened to
have two or three precocious students who had already fully developed an adult-like
theory of race. Thus, the inadvertent grouping of these students in the same order
variable created the effects revealed in the analysis. In future research, larger sample
sizes could minimize this effect.
Another hypothesis that needs to be considered is Direction of Change (whether
the stimulus was changing from black to white or white to black). I hypothesized that
children would be more likely to accept racial change in the direction of the majority.
There was a trend revealed in the direction expected. Children were more likely to
accept racial change from black to white than from white to black. The likely
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explanation for this effect is in-group bias. Nearly all of the children in the study
were Caucasian; therefore, in-group bias would suggest that children would be more
likely to accept changes in the direction of the race that they themselves are. Children
may assume that because they like the race they themselves are then everyone else
probably wants to be the same race, too.
I believed it would be likely that children would remain consistent in their answers
to the type of question asked (whether it is the target or the offspring). Contrary to
my prediction, however, the analysis revealed a main effect of question type.
Children had higher scores for the target stimuli than for the offspring, indicating that
they were more likely to accept changes to the target than to the offspring and
presenting the possibility of a latent understanding of inheritance. The children may
have understood the implications of racial constancy and the process of inheritance,
but their responses were swayed by the salience of the pictorial evidence of the
changes. The evidence that a target person looked one way, went to the doctor, and
now looks like a different race could have been compelling enough to bypass the
inchoate theories of inheritance and racial constancy. This latent knowledge of
inheritance could have been swayed by the pictorial evidence of the target changing
appearance, but could have resurfaced when the offspring's racial categorization was
queried. Put more simply, the children could have been willing to accept a superficial
change in appearance as a de facto change of racial category for a given person.
However, because of the awareness of the implication of inheritance, the original
racial characteristics may have been viewed as being transmitted to the stimulus
person's offspring despite apparent changes to the stimulus person's racial category.
Appendix D contains selected transcriptions that present children's explanations of
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why they believe that the offspring did not change racial categories even though the
target stimulus did. Some children were very clear and consistent in their
understanding and explanation of this concept (see Appendix D, Participant 29).
Other children had a vague understanding that was not consistently applied (see
Appendix D, Participant 32).
So, in light of the findings presented here, how do children view race? Do young
children possess a conceptual, adult-like theory of race? Do very young children
essentialize race as Hirschfeld (1995) suggests? Or is an adult-like theory of race a
gradual development as others suggest (Aboud, 1987; Aboud, 1988; Semaj, 1980)?
The chi square analyses show clearly that preschool children treated race in the same
way that they treated animals and artifacts. Preschool children accepted a change in
racial category as easily as they accepted a coffeepot turning into a birdfeeder. Thus,
it does not appear that young children are essentializing race with the adult-like
understanding that Hirschfeld believes that they have. Second grade students did not
treat animals any differently than they treated artifact changes, but they did appear to
be essentializing race to some extent and treated race as different from artifacts.
Fourth graders essentialized both animals and race, but did not essentialize artifacts.
Fourth graders did not essentialize race with the near unanimity that adults do
(Madole et al., 1999), but more fourth graders essentialized race than did 2nd graders,
and more 2nd graders essentialized race than did preschool children. Children showed
a clear developmental trend toward essentialization of race, from no essentializing at
a young age, to some essentialization in elementary school, to nearly unanimous
essentializing of race in adulthood.
It appears, then, that children are following a development trend toward
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essentializing that begins sometime after preschool and matures fully sometime after
4th grade. What is this transformation that is occurring? Is there a sudden, qualitative
change in how children categorize as some believe (Hirschfeld, 1994, 1995; Keil,
1989; Mandler, 1993), or, as others maintain, is there a gradual, quantitative change
in children's knowledge that leads to this shift in thinking (Madole & Oakes, 1999)?
I believe that there is a gradual, quantitative change in the information that a child
possesses. Some of the children in the 2nd and 4th grade age groups possess pieces of
information that change how they think about racial transformations. Some of these
children have not yet encountered the information they need or, if they possess it,
have not yet learned to apply it to this kind of situation. This information may or may
not be knowledge of inheritance; more exploration needs to be done. It makes sense,
however, that as information becomes available children learn to apply it to various
situations, including racial categorization. Some children may, either through
happenstance or differences in environment, acquire knowledge at different points in
development, and changes to view of racial categorization follow.
So, to summarize, the evidence presented here showed that older children
essentialized race more than did younger children, though not with the unanimity that
Madole et al. (1999) found with adults. There was a developmental progression in
children's essentializing of race, from virtually no essentializing in preschool, to
approximately one third of 4th grade students essentializing race. Inheritance did not
play a significant role in children's treatment of race. It is unclear from this study
whether inheritance is not a piece of knowledge that factors into children's
development of an adult-like theory of race, or if I simply did not manipulate
inheritance in the right manner. Follow up studies need to be done to clarify the role,
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or lack of role, that inheritance plays in children's understanding of race.
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When this animal was born, it did things that rabbits usually do. Here are pictures of
this animal's mommy and daddy. Here is a picture of the animal when it grew up.
One day the animal got sick, so the vet gave it some medicine. But the medicine was
too strong, and the little animal lost its long ears. It grew a bushy tail and behaved
like a squirrel. The animal could not be changed to be the way it was before. Here is
a picture of what the animal now. What is this animal? Is this animal still a rabbit, or
is it now a squirrel? If this animal had babies, what would its babies be?

When Sally was little, she did the things that young white girls usually do and looked
like most white people. Here are some pictures of Sally's mommy and daddy. Here
is a picture of Sally when she grew up. One day Sally went to the doctor, who
changed the way Sally looks. Her skin was made to be darker and her face and hair
were changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here is a
picture of Sally now. What is Sally? Is Sally still a white person, or is she now a
black person? If Sally had babies, what would they be?

When Bruce was little, he did the things that young white boys usually do and looked
like most white people. Here are some pictures of Bruce's mommy and daddy. Here
is a picture of Bruce when he grew up. One day Bruce went to the doctor, who
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changed the way Bruce looks. His skin was made to be darker and his face and hair
were changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here is a
picture of Bruce now. What is Bruce? Is Bruce still a white person, or is he now a
black person? If Bruce had children, what would his children be?

When Bob was little, he did things that people with long hair do. He brushed his hair
and pulled it back in a ponytail. Here are pictures of Bob's mommy and daddy. Here
is a picture of Bob when he grew up. One day Bob went to the barbershop to have his
hair cut, and the barber cut off almost all of Bob's hair and made it so it could never
grow long again. Here is a picture of Bob now. What is Bob, a long haired person or
a short haired person? If Bob had children, what would his children be?

When Sharon was little, she did the things that young black girls usually do and
looked like most black people. Here are some pictures of Sharon's mommy and
daddy. Here is picture of Bob when he grew up. One day Sharon went to the doctor,
who changed the way Sharon looks. Her skin was made to be lighter and her face and
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hair were changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here
is picture of Sharon now. What is Sharon? Is Sharon still a black person, or is she
now a white person? If Sharon had babies, what would her babies be?

When Billy was little, he did the things that young black boys usually do and looked
like most black people. Here are some pictures of Billy's mommy and daddy. Here
is a picture of Billy when he grew up. One day Billy went to the doctor, who changed
the way Billy looks. His skin was made to be lighter and his face and hair were
changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here is a picture
of Billy now. What is Billy? Is Billy still a black person, or is he now a white
person? If Billy had babies, what would his babies be?

When this thing was made, it was used to pour out coffee. Here are some other things
made in the same factory. This is a picture of this thing when it was made. Then
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some people took it. They took some pieces off of it, made some other changes, and
filled it with seeds. None of what they did to it could be changed back again. After
they did all of this, they used it to feed birds. Here is a picture of this thing now.
What is this thing? Is it still a coffeepot, or is it now a birdfeeder?

Appendix B
Informed Consent and Child Assent Documents
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Dear Parent/Guardian:
Your child is invited to participate in a study of children's understanding of
how animals, objects, and people can change. The aim of our study is to better
understand how children think about people, and especially about race. This study is
being conducted by Dr. Kelly Madole and Jason Glerum of Western Kentucky
University in cooperation with your child's school. The project will be conducted in
one short session at your child's school, in cooperation with your child's teacher. We
will coordinate the session with your child's teacher so that your child does not miss
any important learning activities.
The session will take about 15 minutes; your child will be interviewed
individually. If you agree to allow your child to take part in this research, your child
will be read eight brief stories describing animals, objects, or people undergoing some
changes. The changes to people involve a change in the individual's race (from
black to white or from white to black). After being read each story, your child will be
asked to decide whether the object, animal or person has really changed. Responses
may be tape recorded to ensure that all information is collected accurately. The tape
recordings will be accessible only to the researchers and will be destroyed after the
information is transcribed.
We emphasize that your child's participation is entirely voluntary. If you or
your child decides not to participate, it will have no negative outcome for you or your
child in any way. Your child may refuse to answer any question and may withdraw
from the study at any time. Individual participants' responses will be kept
anonymous. The results may be part of a published research project in which all
results would be reported in terms of group averages, and no children will ever be
identified by name. If you wish, group information will be available in a written
report of the results.
The procedures in this study have been reviewed and approved by the Western
Kentucky University Committee for the Protection for Human Research Participants.
The University has filed a form called "Assurance of Compliance with DHHD
regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects" with the Department of Health and
Human Services.
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Specific questions about this study may be directed to Dr. Kelly Madole,
Research Director for this project at (270) 745-6475. We urge you to phone if you
have any questions. We will be happy to hear from you.
We hope that you will allow your child to take part in our study. We promise
to make it a pleasant experience and to schedule our sessions in cooperation with your
child's teacher. Please fill in your child's name, your child's, date of birth, and
teacher's name below. To indicate your consent, sign your name, and fill in the date
below. When your child returns this letter to the teacher, whether you say yes or no,
your child will receive a Western Kentucky University "Big Red" pencil.
Thank you for your help.
Sincerely,
Kelly Madole, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Jason Glerum
Graduate Student

Western Kentucky University
Parental Consent Form

Child's name:

Date of Birth:

Teacher's name:
No. I do not give my consent for my child to participate in this study.
Yes. I have read the information provided about this study, and give my
consent for my child to participate in the individual interview that is part of the study
conducted by Dr. Kelly Madole and Jason Glerum of Western Kentucky University.
I understand that although my child may be tape recorded, anonymity and security of
data will be maintained. I also understand that I may withdraw my child from the
study at any time without penalty.
Parent/Guardian
signature:

Date:
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CHILD/MINOR ASSENT FORM

I,
understand that my parents (mom and
dad) have said it's okay for me to take part in a project about how things can change
under the direction of Kelly Madole and Jason Glerum.
I am taking part because I want to. I know that I will be tape recorded but that only
the people working with Kelly and Jason will be able to hear the tape. I have been
told that I can stop any time I want to and nothing will happen to me if I want to stop.

Signature

Appendix C
Orders for Stimulus Presentation

48
Order One

Order Two

Animal transformation

Artifact transformation

White to Black Female transformation

Male Black to White transformation

White to Black Male transformation

Female Black to White transformation

Long Hair to Short Hair transformation

Long Hair to Short Hair transformation

Black to White Female transformation

Male White to Black transformation

Black to White Male transformation

Female White to Black transformation

Coffeepot to Birdfeeder transformation

Animal transformation

Appendix D
Selected Transcriptions
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1. Participant 29: Male 8y/o Caucasian: Inheritance, Order 2, Set 2
Examiner: Female black to white race change story (...is she still a black person?)
Child: Uhn-uh. Shaking head
Examiner: She's now a white person?
Child: Mm-hmm. Nodding.
Examiner: Okay, what would her babies be if she had babies?
Child: White.
Examiner: White? Why do you think they would be white?
Child: Well, I think they'd be black, really, because it's not changing everything in
your body. It's not changing every kind of part in your body. Because whatever
makes the baby, it's probably gonna ... probably, probably born to be black but you
got your skin changed so it would still probably be black, because that's just you
that'd be white.
Examiner: Okay. So, you think that she would be white, but the babies would be
black?
Child: nod
Examiner: Yeah? Why do you think that she would be whi...
Child: Sort of tan.
Examiner: Sort of tan? Why do you think that Sally would be white?
Child: Because she got her, umm.., her skin changed.
Examiner: Okay, but that doesn't mean that her babies' skin would be changed?
Child: Shaking head.
Examiner: No? Okay.
Child: Cuz you didn't change the babies.
Examiner: Male white to black race change story.
Child: A black person.
Examiner: What would his babies be?
Child: White...?
Examiner: Why do you think they'd be white?
Child: long pause
Examiner: Same reason as before?
Child: Yeah.
Examiner: Which was what?
Child: Cuz they didn't change, you know, the parts his body and stuff and then like,
whatever makes the babies, it would probably like, it ain't changing that, it's just
changing him.
Examiner: Okay, so there are parts of your body other than your skin that makes you
black or white?
Child: nod. Mm-hmm.
2. Participant 32: Female 7y/o African-American: Inheritance, Order 1, Set 2
Examiner: Female white to black race change story
Child: Um, a black person.
Examiner: If she had babies, what would her babies be?
Child: Uh...white.
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Examiner: They'd be white?
Child: nod
Examiner: Why do you think her babies would be white?
Child: Because that's her body.
Examiner: What do you mean by that?
Child: Like.. .under the skin that the doctor did, it's really white.
Examiner: So the doctor just changed the skin...
Child: Uh-huh.
Examiner: ...but underneath the skin there is still something else?
Child: nod
Examiner: Okay. What else is it, do you think? What is it that didn't change?
Child: Her heart, and other parts of her body.
Examiner: Female black to white race change story.
Child: Uh, white.
Examiner: If she had babies, what would her babies be? Black babies, or white
babies?
Child: Uhh... probably white.
Examiner: Why do you think they would be white?
Child: Because she's a white person now, and she's.. .gonna have white babies.

